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Abstract. In Tullock's rent-seeking model, the probability a player wins the game depends on ex- 
penditures raised to the power R. We show that a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, ex- 
ists when R > 2, and that overdissipation f rents does not arise in any Nash equilibrium. We der- 
ive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when 
the strategy space is discrete, and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space 
is continuous. Our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dis- 
sipation of rents. 
1. Introduction 
In  Tu l lock  (1980) the fo l low ing  interest ing rent -seek ing ame is descr ibed.  
Cons ider  two players who  b id  for  a pol i t ica l  favor  commonly  known to be 
wor th  Q dol lars (Q > 0 and f inite).  The i r  bids in f luence the probab i l i ty  o f  
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receiving the favor. Let x and y denote the bids of agents 1 and 2 respectively, 
and let n(x,y) denote the probability the first agent is awarded the political 
favor. The payoff to agent 1 from bidding x when the other agent bids y is 
Ul(xly ) = Tt(x,y)Q - x, (1) 
while that of player two is symmetrically defined: 
U2(YlX ) = [1 - ~(x,y)]Q - y 
Because the politician awarding the prize may have other considerations, or
because he can only imperfectly discriminate between the bids (if bids are not 
made in the money metric), the high bidder is not guaranteed the prize. This 
is a common assumption i (1) the principal-agent literature (Lazear and Ros- 
en, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Bull, Schotter and Weigelt, 1987), (2)the 
political campaign expenditure literature (Snyder, 1990); and (3) the literature 
on rationing by waiting in line (Holt and Sherman, 1982). Presumably, given 
y, the probability of winning is an increasing function of x. Tullock suggested 
the specification 
~(x,y) = J xR 
+ yR 
if x= y = 0 
otherwise (x _> 0, y > 0), 
(2) 
where R > 0. This specification has become standard in the rent-seeking litera- 
ture and other fields, see, e.g., Snyder (1990). 1 The case where R = 1 is 
studied most (Ellingsen, 1991; Nitzan, 1991a; Paul and Wilhite, 1991), but it 
is of interest to consider other values of R, as in Applebaum and Katz (1986) 
and Millner and Pratt (1989). Loosely speaking, the case 0 < R < 1 represents 
decreasing returns, while R > 1 represents increasing returns to aggressive bid- 
ding. While the two agent pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium isstraight- 
forward to calculate from the first-order conditions when 0 < R _< 2, this is 
not the case when R > 2. Consequently Tullock (1980) devoted a large part 
of his discussion to these latter cases. 
To date, there are only conjectures concerning the existence of a Nash 
equilibrium for R > 2 but finite. Rowley (1991), in his review of Tullock's 
work, lists this as one of the three important theoretical problems for a research 
program in the area of rent-seeking. The problem is not so much that the first- 
order condition for a maximum cannot be calculated; the problem is that the 
symmetric (x = y) solution to the two players' first-order conditions does not 
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Tab& 1. Millner and Pratt (1989) hypotheses and experimental results 
H o Experiment H o Experiment 
Exponent R = 1 R = 3 
Mean individual 2 2.24 6 3.34 
Expenditures (2.42) ( - 24.28) 
Mean dissipation 50°7o 56% 150% 84% 
Rates (2.37) ( - 13.37) 
Number of observations 146 100 
necessarily ield a global maximum (if R > 2 the symmetric solution to the 
first-order conditions implies a negative xpected payoff,  which is dominated 
by a zero bid). In such a case the sum of the solutions to the first-order condi- 
tions exceeds the value of the prize Q; there is the false appearance o f  an over 
dissipation o f  rents. Tullock (1980, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989) devoted considera- 
ble attention to the case of over dissipation because of the induced excess ocial 
waste; see Dougan (1991) for a critical comment, and Laband and Sophocleus 
(1992) for estimates of the resource xpenditures. In Tullock (1984) it was ac- 
knowledged that over dissipation may be due to a failure of the second-order 
conditions 2 In the vernacular of the game theory, over dissipation is not part 
of a Nash equilibrium. This notwithstanding, the possibility of over dissipation 
is a recurrent heme in the rent-seeking literature. 
In particular, Millner and Pratt (1989) examined the rent-seeking model ex- 
perimentally for the cases where R = 1 and R = 3. Due to the use of laboratory 
dollars, the strategy space used in their experiment is discrete. For a prize worth 
8 U.S. dollars they formulate two hypotheses concerning the mean of the in- 
dividual expenditures and the mean dissipation rates. These hypotheses are 
stated in Table 1, together with their experimental results. 3 Both hypotheses 
are rejected for either value of R, but at markedly different p-values. The p- 
value for the R = 1 case is at least .015, while the p-value for R = 3 is at the 
most 10 -40. Thus, H 0 is onty rejected marginally for the case R = 1, while H 0 
is strongly rejected for the case R = 3. Shogren and Baik (1991) point out, 
however, that the null hypothesis for the case R = 3 is not the correct one. The 
problem, however, is that the equilibrium to the game is not known when R 
> 2. Our paper resolves this issue. 
More specifically, for R = 1, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is known, and 
the associated expenditure and dissipation rates are readily verified to cor- 
respond with the hypothesized values in Table 1. This is further corroborated 
by a recent experiment by Millner and Pratt (1991) which shows that risk aver- 
sion can explain the discrepancies between the hypothesized and realized values 
in Table 1 for the case when R = I. A major benefit of  the results presented 
below is that we will be able to explain the discrepancy between the hypo- 
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thesized values and experimental results for the case when R = 3. The punch- 
line is that the formula based on the first-order equations (which yields a rent 
dissipation of 150%) is incorrect. In fact, there is not a symmetric pure-strategy 
equilibrium when R = 3. We characterize the "correct" Nash equilibrium, and 
show that the results of the Millner-Pratt experiments are in line with the theo- 
retically correct Nash equilibrium mixed strategies. To this end we mainly fo- 
cus on the two agent case in discrete strategy space. In the last section we con- 
sider a continuous strategy space by taking limits of the finite game. 
Before we embark on this, we briefly review the approaches others have used 
to deal with the R > 2 case. The approach in the existing literature isto modify 
the original game to remove the apparent over dissipation of rents. In his origi- 
nal contribution Tullock (1980) suggested three modifications. The first is to 
let R be infinite, which turns the game into an all-pay auction. Within the rent- 
seeking literature this version has been studied by Hillman and Samet (1987). 
The complete characterization f all equilibrium strategies has been obtained 
by Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1990), and the equilibrium level of rent dissi- 
pation is derived in Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993). The second type of 
modification is to change the one shot game into a dynamic game. Tullock 
(1980) discusses the case of alternating bids, and this has been formalized re- 
cently by Leininger (1990) and Leininger and Yang (1990). In Corcoran (1984), 
Corcoran and Karels (1985), and Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1987) the 
game is changed into a two-stage game. In the first stage the number of par- 
ticipants is selected such that, when the rent-seeking game is played in stage 
two, the number of participants is consistent with (almost) complete rent dissi- 
pation. Similarly, Michaels (1988) devises a etting within which the politician 
has the incentive to adjust the exponent such that the first- and second-order 
conditions are met. The third modification deals with asymmetries b tween the 
players. This was briefly dealt with in Tullock (1980) and has been further in- 
vestigated by Allard (1988). Finally Nitzan (1991b) introduces coalition be- 
havior on the part of the contestants. None of these contributions, though, 
offers a solution to the original simultaneous move rent-seeking game when R 
> 2. The next section provides this solution and relates it to the experimental 
and theoretical literatures. 
2. Solving the rent-seeking ame 
Consider the two-agent rent-seeking game with conditional payoffs and win- 
ning probabilities a given in equations (1) and (2). The exponent satisfies R 
> 0. Suppose a pure strategy equilibrium exists. Given y > 0, the first- and 
second-order conditions for an unconstrained (local) maximum of Ul(Xly) are 
readily calculated as 
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Q 
and 
RyRxR- 1 
(x R + yR)2 
1 = O, (3) 
RyRx R-2 
Q [ (R-1) (x  R + yR) _ 2Rx R] < 0. (4) 
(X R + yR)3 
Assuming a symmetric solution, condition (3) yields x = y = QR/4,  for 
which condition (4) is readily seen to hold locally for any R > 0. Substituting 
back into equation (1) yields 
- •  Q (1 - R ) ; i = 1,2. (5) Ui(x = y = ) = ~- 
Note that in this case Ui(. ].) is non-negative as long as R _< 2. Moreover, 
for any x, y > 0 the factor (R - 1)(x R + yR) _ 2R x R in the second-order con- 
dition (4) is unambiguously negative if R _< t, while it is positive over some 
interval to right of x = 0 if R > I and becomes negative thereafter. In particu- 
lar, (4) is satisfied when x = y. Thus for R _< 2, the symmetric solution × = 
y = QR/4 constitutes a Nash Equilibrium. For R > 2, U(QR/4[QR/4)  in (5) 
becomes negative and hence the first-order conditions do not yield a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium point (because one can choose x = 0 given that y = QR/4; 
and earn a higher payoff.  But if x = 0 is chosen, player two has an incentive 
to lower y to small ~ > 0). Generally, the first- and second-order conditions 
(3) and (4) fail to characterize the global maximum when R > 2. 4 
In order to find a solution for the case R > 2, we focus on the game with 
a discrete strategy space. This yields a version of the game similar to that used 
in the laboratory experiments by Millner and Pratt (1989), 1991). 5 Due to the 
use of laboratory dollars, the bids are necessarily discrete, and thus the game 
is a so-called finite game. 6Nash's (1951) theorem guarantees that every finite 
game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium. 7 It follows immediately that the Tu!- 
lock rent-seeking game in discrete strategy space has a Nash equilibrium, possi- 
bly in non-degenerate mixed strategies, for any R > 2. While it is in general 
difficult to characterize the equilibria, we may be more specific in this case. 
Note that for any strategy pair (x,y), the payoff  to the second agent is the same 
as the payoff  to the first agent if the strategies played by the two agents are in- 
terchanged; the game is symmetric. Recalling that an equilibrium is defined to 
be a symmetric equilibrium if all players choose the same strategy, we may ap- 
ply Dasgupta nd Maskin's (1986) Lemma 6; a finite symmetric game has a 
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. 
In summary, the Tullock rent-seeking ame with a discrete strategy space 
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certainly has a symmetric Nash equilibrium, even when R > 2. These results 
immediately raise the following questions: (i) Can we characterize the 
equilibria for R > 2, even though previous authors have been unable to do so? 
In particular, is it possible to provide an explicit solution for the symmetric 
equilibria that arise for different values of R? (ii) Can the equilibria of the finite 
game be used to shed light on infinite game (continuous trategy space) 
equilibria? A derivative question is: (iii) How do the answers to these questions 
relate to the experimental work reported by Millner and Pratt for the case R 
= 3? 
We answer question (i) by employing a device which was first used by Shilo- 
ny (1985). The payoffs to the game will be written in matrix format. We then 
show this yields a matrix equation which can be manipulated to yield the sym- 
metric mixed strategy solution. Some numerical examples and a special case of 
this procedure are provided. To answer the derivative question (iii) we manipu- 
late the matrix equation to obtain tight bounds on the equilibrium dissipation 
rate. Question (ii) is answered by letting the mesh of the strategy space become 
small relative to the value of the prize. 
Recall equation (1) which gives the conditional payoffs for agent 1. To ob- 
tain the unconditional or expected payoffs from playing x, EUI(x ), the condi- 
tional payoffs are premultiplied by the (mixed-strategy) probability py that a 
particular y value is being played by player one's opponent, and subsequently 
these are summed over y. Thus 
Q 
EUI(X ) = ]~ py n(x,y) Q - x. (6) 
y=0 
Denote the expected payoffs to agents 1 and 2 in an arbitrary Nash equilibrium 
by v I and v 2 respectively. In the case of a symmetric Nash equilibrium note 
that the players' expected payoffs are identical, v I = v 2 = v (however, v need 
not be unique). The manipulations below make repeated use of the following 
general result. 
Theorem 1. In any equilibrium: (i) EUI(x) <-- v 1, (ii) EUI(X) = v 1 when Px > 
0, while (iii) Px = 0 if EUI(x ) < v r Similar results hold for player 2. 
A proof of this theorem can be found in Vorob'ev (1977, sec. 3.2.2., 3.4.2. and 
3.4.3.). For a symmetric equilibrium - which we know exists by Lemma 6 in 
Dasgupta nd Maskin (1986) - we can use equations (6) and (2) to restate the 
condition EUI(x) _< v as 
Q x R v+x 
]~ Py yR -< - -  (7) y :0  x R + Q 
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Conditions (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 1 imply a complementary slackness-type 
condition for a symmetric equilibrium of the form 
Q x R v+x]  
py = O. V X: Px = ~0 y x R + yR Q 
(7')  
Now note that EUI(X = Q) _< 0, and in fact EU~(x = Q) < 0 if Py=0 • 1 (and 
R is finite). Thus in a symmetric equilibrium no mass will be placed at Q, i.e. 
Px=q = Py=q = 0. Suppose (without loss of generality but for ease of nota- 
tion) that Q a N, and that x and y can only take on the integer values, 0, 1 , . . . ,  
Q. Note that there are exactly Q conditions (7) for x = 0, I, . . . ,  Q - 1. These 
can be conveniently expressed in matrix format: 
1 
0 0 
1 1 
1 ~ 1 +2 R 
2 R 1 
1 
2R+ 1 
(Q-l)  R (Q-D R 
(Q - 1) R + 1 (Q - 1) R + 2 R 
0 
1 
1 + (Q - 1) R 
2 R 
2 R + (Q - 1)R 
1 
P0 
Pl 
P2 
v 
Q 
v+l  
v+2 
--< Q ..... (8) 
In addition to this Q x Q matrix condition, the following constraints must be 
imposed: 
Q- t  
py ---- 1; py _> O, y = O, 1 . . . . .  Q. (9) 
y=O 
Condition (8), together with the constraints (9) and the complementary 
slackness condition (7 ') provide a complete, but implicit characterization of
the symmetric equilibrium, which we know exists by Dasgupta nd Maskin's 
Lemma 6. These conditions form a linear programming problem which, at 
least in principle, can be solved for (P0 . . . . .  PQ- 1, v). We have thus proved 
Theorem 2. Suppose the strategy space is discrete. Then for any R > 2, the TuI- 
lock rent-seeking game has a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, de- 
fined implicitly by the solution to conditions (7'),  (8) and (9). 
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In order to illustrate the practical utility of Theorem 2, we will investigate 
two special cases: R = oo and R = 3. The latter case is that examined in Millner 
and Pratt's experiments, while the former is the discrete strategy space version 
of the all pay auction examined in Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1990; 1993). 
We begin with the case when the exponent R = co and assume Q > 1 for 
simplicity. In this case the matrix expression in (8) becomes 
1 
0 0 0 
1 
1 ~ 0 0 
1 
1 1 ~ . . .  0 
P0 
Pl 
1 1 1 
p2 i- 
t 
1 
PQ - 
v 
O 
v+l  
O 
v+2 
O 
v+Q-1  
(10) 
O 
It is straightforward to find symmetric equilibria if it is assumed that all 
Pi > 0. In this case the matrix inequality (10) becomes an equality by Theorem 
1. The lower triangular matrix equation can then be solved through recursive 
substitution. This yields P0 = P2 = P4 . . . .  = 2v/Q and Pl = P3 = P5 = 
. . .  = 2(1 -v ) /Q .  In addition to (8), conditions (9) and (7') have to hold. For 
even values of Q this restricts v ~ [0, 1], while for odd values of Q, we necessari- 
ly have v = 1/2 (see Bouckaert, Degrijse, and de Vries, 1992, for a proof of 
this claim). 
Note that we may make the grid in the formulation of the game (7) finer and 
finer and normalize the value of the prize to be one by dividing all dollar units 
by Q and letting Q tend to infinity. The equilibrium distributions in this dis- 
crete game with R = oo then converge uniformly to the continuous uniform 
distribution, and the expected payoff v /Q converges to zero; there is full rent 
dissipation. Also note that equations (I) and (2) can be expressed as 
Ul(xly) = I1 
Q-x  i fx>y 
Q x i fx=y 
x i fx<y 
(11) 
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which is precisely the definition of the all-pay auction (cf. Baye, Kovenock, and 
de Vries, 1993). It follows that the symmetric equilibria of the discrete all-pay 
auction converge to the unique (see Baye et al., 1990) equilibrium of the con- 
tinuous strategy space two player all-pay auction. 
Next, consider the case of finite exponents. When 0 < R _< 2, the game has 
a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (x = y = QR/4) as discussed earlier. 
Because R = 3 is used in Millner and Pratt 's experimental work on the game, 
and as pointed out by Shogren and Baik (1991) the "solut ion" examined by 
Mitlner and Pratt is not really a Nash equilibrium, we will focus on this case. 8 
For R > 2 and finite, the solutions to the game cannot be given in the same 
compact form as the solution for R -- ~ ,  although conditions (7'),  (8) and (9) 
still provide a complete but implicit description of the game and its solution. 
For any specific values of R and Q, it can be solved explicitly through linear 
programming. We list some examples. 
(i) R =- 3, Q -- 1. There is one pure strategy solution: both agents bid zero 
and receive v = 1/2. Inter alia, this result holds for any finite value of R. 
(ii) R = 3, Q = 2. There exist multiple pure strategy solutions: (1) both bid 
zero and receive v = 1, (2) one agent bids zero and the other bids one with 
respective payoffs v 1 = 0 and v 2 = 1, and (3) both agents bid one and receive 
v = 0. Mixed strategies whereby agents randomize over (some) of the pure 
strategy solutions exist as well. 
(iii) R = 3, Q = 3. This case is still solvable by hand. In particular, condition 
(8) becomes 
0 0 
1 1 
8 1 
! P0 
Pl 
P2 
-] ~- -1 
V 
v+2 
-5- 
(12) 
1 3 3 3 
It is readily verified that (P0, Pl, P2) = (7 ' 7 ' 7 ) and v = t-4 satisfy con- 
dition (12) and the other conditions of Theorem 2, and hence constitute an 
equilibrium to the game. 
(iv) R = 3, Q = 4. This case is already too cumbersome to solve by hand, 
so we relied on the analytical computer program "Der ive"  to solve this game. 
It can be checked that there are two symmetric solutions: (i) (P0, Pl, P2, P3) = 
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5 , 0, ~ ,  0 with v = ~,  and (ii) (P0, Pl, P2, P3) = , 0, ~-~ , 0 
3 
with v - 
19 
For R = 3 and Q > 4, one generally finds that all probability mass is loaded 
on the first few probabilities py, with most mass loaded on the higher py'S, and 
0 < v < 1. For Q > 15 the computational burden increases rapidly and exact 
solutions take an excessive amount of computer time. This is a bit unfortunate 
because the experiment conducted by Millner and Pratt (1989) used R = 3 and 
a grid of Q = 80 (at the end of the experiment the laboratory dollars were con- 
verted into U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of 10. But subject payments were 
also rounded to the nearest 25 cents, generating a grid of 32 with unequal grid 
sizes). Their hypotheses and tests, however, all concern mean individual expen- 
ditures and mean dissipation rates. The question therefore is whether we have 
something to offer concerning these quantities, without explicitly calculating 
the solutions. 9 
The expected individual expenditures and the expected dissipation rates can 
be calculated from equation (6). Note that premultiplication of EUI(X) by Px 
and summation over x gives the expected equilibrium payoff to player 1 in a 
symmetric equilibrium: 
o o )o  
EUI= ]~ Px EUI(X)= ]~ Px py n(x ,y )Q-x  = 
x=0 x=0 y=0 x=0 
px v ~-~ V, 
(13) 
because player one only loads mass on those x's which generate the same 
(highest) expected payoff equal to v (see Theorem 1 above). 
In order to dispel the claim that over dissipation of rents is expected when 
R > 2, first note that if agent 1 chooses x = 0 with probability 1, then 
Q t 
EU 1 = ]] pyrC(0,y)Q = P0 ~ Q >- 0. (14) 
y=O 
Hence each player can guarantee a non-negative expected payoff. Secondly, 
the expected dissipation rate is easily calculated from EU 1 + EU 2. Note that 
in any equilibrium, 
v 1 = EU 1 = Prob[agent 1 wins] Q - ~, 
where ~ = EPxX is the average individual expenditure. Adding up yields 
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v I + v 2 = [Prob[agent lwins} + Prob{agent2wins}]Q-  g -  y. 
But since the prize is always awarded, there is always a winning agent and hence 
by (14) 
0_< v 1 + v 2 = Q - ~-  y, (15) 
so that ~ + ~- <_ Q. The expected rate of rent dissipation, D, is defined as D 
= (g  + y-)/Q. Thus 
D 1 vl + v2 = _< 1. (16) 
O 
We have thus proved: 
Theorem 3. The two player finite rent-seeking game devised by Tullock never 
involves over dissipation in any (possibly mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium for 
any R > 0. That is, D _< 1 always. 
The dissipation rate is also bounded from below. But in contrast with the upper 
bound, the lower bound depends on the value of the exponent R. Tl-ds can be 
easily seen by investigating the two limiting cases R = 0 and R = co. In the 
former case there is no dissipation, while in the latter case dissipation can be 
complete. Therefore, we will investigate specific values of R. To explain the 
Millner-Pratt experimental results for the case R = 3, one requires precise in- 
formation about the size of D, and hence the tighter the lower bound on D the 
better. It is not too difficult to show for Q > 2, R > 2, that in any equilibrium 
the dissipation rate is at least 50°7o. With more effort, for Q > 3 a sharper lower 
bound for the symmetric equilibria is obtained in Theorem 4. 
Theorem 4. In any symmetric Nash equilibrium of the two player Tullock rent- 
seeking ame with co > R > 2 and oo > Q > 2, the dissipation rate is bounded 
2 
from below by 1 - - - .  Q 
Proof. The proof  comes in two parts. In Part 1 we assume that P0 > 0, arid 
show that this implies v _< 1. Hence D ___ 1 - 2/Q. In Part 2 we show that 
P0 = 0 implies v < 1. Some of the computations from Part 2 are relegated to 
the Appendix. 
Part  1. Suppose that Po > 0. Then (by Theorem 1) for x = 0 condition (7) 
necessarily becomes an equality: P0 = 2 v/Q,  so that v = Qp0/2. Because P0 
is bounded above by 1, v is bounded above by Q/2. This implies D __ 0. To 
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improve the upper bound on v, i.e., to lower it f rom Q/2  to 1, we continue the 
presumption P0 > 0. From condition (7), for x = 1 we have 
v+l  1 
P0 + ~t _<- - ;0_< ~t <- .  
Q 2 
To see this note that all the probabilities n(1 ,y) except he first in the second 
row of  matrix condit ion (8) are less than or equal to 1/2. Combine the 
presumption P0 = 2v/Q with the above inequality to get 
1 v 
a _ (17) 
Q Q 
Hence 1 - v > ~tQ _> 0. Therefore 1 > v. 
Part  2. We now show that P0 = 0 implies v < 1. Let x be the first row for 
which Px > 0, x ¢ 0, i.e., Po = . - .  = Px-1 = 0. Then condition (7) holds 
as an equality for this row, i.e., 
1 x R x R 
Px + x R -t- (x+l )  R Px+l + " '"  + x R + (Q_ I )R  PQ-1  = 
v+x (18) 
Q ' 
We will show that v >__ 1 and P0 = 0 are incompatible. For x + 1, condit ion 
(7) reads as follows: 
(X + 1) R 1 
(X+I)R + xR P× + ~ Px+~ + "'" + 
v+l+x 
< _ _  
Q 
(X+ 1) R 
(x+l )  R + (Q- l )  R PQ- 1 
(19) 
Compute Px f rom the equality (18), and substitute this into the weak inequali- 
ty (19). This yields the following weak inequality: 
I 1 2 (x + 1) R x R ] 2 (x+ 1) R + x R x R + (x+ 1) R Px+l + - ' '  + 
(x+ 1) g (x+ 1) g . . . .  2 
(x+l )  g + (Q- l )  R (x+l )  g + x g 
xR ] 
x R + (Q-1)if" PQ- 
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1 (x+ 1) R 
_<- -  {v+l+x - 2(v+x)  }. (20) 
Q (x+ 1) R + x R 
In the Appendix we manipulate the two sides of inequality (20) to show that 
if v >__ 1 the left-hand side is non-negative while the right-hand side is strictly 
negative. (Note that the proof would be particularly simple if R = oo, since 
then (20) reduces to 0 _< Px+l --<- 2 (1 -v -x ) /Q . )  This yields a contradiction 
so that the supposition P0 = 0 and v _> 1 are incompatible. QED 
3. Millner and Pratt revisited 
How do the above theoretical results compare with the experimental evidence 
reported by Millner and Pratt (1989)? Note that for Q large Theorems 3 and 
4 provide tight bounds. In particular, given the values of R = 3 and Q = 80 
used in the Millner and Pratt experiments, the symmetric (mixed-strategy) 
equilibrium expected outlays are ~.= ~2 = 3.9 (after conversion to U.S. dollars) 
and the corresponding interval for the expected rent dissipation is D E [97.5%, 
100%] - it is not the 150 percent dissipation rate used as the null hypothesis 
by Millner and Pratt. Using the experimental evidence reported by Millner and 
Pratt, we find the following t-statistics for the null hypotheses: -5.11 and 
-2.73 respectively. 1° Compare these to the values reported by Millner and 
Pratt and reproduced in Table 1 above. (If the rounding to the nearest 25 cents 
in the actual payout is taken into account, the mean dissipation rate is reduced 
to approximately 93.75, which does not differ significantly from the ex- 
perimental result at the 5% level). Note that these t-statistics are of the same 
order of magnitude as those for the case R = 1. Also recall the experimental 
work by Millner and Pratt (1991) which relates the relatively small discrepancy 
for the case R = 1 to the existence of risk aversion. 11 Our conjecture is that 
the remaining discrepancy for the case R = 3 can be explained in a similar way. 
Importantly, though, the above shows that when the correct symmetric (mixed- 
strategy) Nash equilibrium is used as the theoretical benchmark to form the 
null hypothesis, Millner and Pratt's empirical results for the case R = 3 and 
Q = 80 accord well with state-of-the art rent-seeking theory. Individuals eem 
to behave quite efficiently after all. 
4. Summary and results for the continuous strategy space case 
In this paper we have solved the original rent-seeking game devised by Tullock 
for the case where the rent-seeking exponent (R) exceeds two. A constructive 
method was used to find the explicit solution for the finite game (i.e., the 
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Tullock game in discrete strategy space). Our theoretical results, which estab- 
lish that rents are under dissipated when R > 2, accord welt with the existing 
experimental evidence. We also provide tight bounds on the rate of dissipation 
as the mesh of the strategy space decreases. 
Up to this point we have not addressed the solution to the infinite rent- 
seeking game, i.e., when the strategy space is continous and R > 2. It turns 
out the payoff functions in equation (1) satisfy the conditions of Theorem 6 
in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), guaranteeing the existence of a symmetric 
mixed strategy equilibrium for the rent-seeking game with a continuous strate- 
gy space. The proof of their theorem relies on finite approximation of the game 
and then letting the grid size become finer and finer, as we did in our example 
with an infinite R. Thus the construction of the equilibrium to the finite game 
in the previous ection is driven to the limit. Under sufficient regularity condi- 
tions this method indeed yields a solution to the infinite game. 
The application of Dasgupta nd Maskin's Theorem 6 requires four condi- 
tions, each of which is satisfied for the Tullock game with a continuous strategy 
space. In particular, this theorem requires: (i) The sum of the payoffs must be 
upper semi-continous. From equations (1) and (2) we easily see that Ul(xly) + 
U2(x ly  ) = Q - x - y, which is continuous and therefore upper semi- 
continuous as well. (ii) The subset of discontinuities in the payoffs must be of 
a dimension lower than 2, and one must be able to express the elements of this 
subset as functions which relate the strategy of one player to the strategy of the 
other. For the Tullock game with R < Qo, this condition is simple to check, 
as x = y = 0 constitutes the only point of discontinuity. The condition guaran- 
tees that the discontinuities are relatively unimportant (have measure zero). (iii) 
The payoff Ul(xly) must be bounded. This holds evidently as -Q  _< Ul(xiy) 
_ Q on [0,Q]. (iv) Finally, Ul(X]y) must be weakly lower semi-continuous. 
The only point where there could arise a problem is at the point of discontinui- 
ty, but as Ul(xly = 0) is lower semi-continuous, it is certainly weakly lower 
semi-continuous. This last condition guarantees that, loosely speaking, a play- 
er does not want to put weight on the discontinuity point even if the other play- 
er does, because payoffs may jump down but do not jump up. 
Thus we conclude that a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists for the 
continuous trategy space rent-seeking game for all R > 2 as well. An explicit 
closed form solution remains for future investigation. For the special case R 
= co, a full characterization f all the equilibria is available even when there 
are more than two players; see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1990, 1993). 
Other interesting questions include the explicit solution to asymmetric versions 
of the game, as well as further experimental work along the lines suggested 
above. These remain the focus of our future research. 
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Notes 
1. While our focus is on the Tnllock specification in (2), several of our results are valid for other 
functional forms of n. In particular, so tong as 0 _< n(x,y) _< 1 and n(x,y) + n(y,x) = 1, any 
Nash equilibrium satisfies the properties tated in Theorem 1 below, and our Theorem 3 on 
the impossibility of  overdissipation carries through. Only the tight lower bound on the dissipa- 
tion rate given in Theorem 4 is dependent on the specific functional form in (2). We thank a 
referee for encouraging us to point this out. 
2. Briefly considering the n-player variant, n ~ 2, the second order conditions fail if R > 
n / (n -2 ) ,  cf. Tullock (1984) (where the reverse condition is reported erroneously). Note that 
for the case n = 2 the second order conditions are always satisfied. But it is easily checked 
that for R > 2 the symmetric solution to the first-order conditions yields UI(. ].) < 0, and 
hence is not a global maximum. Thus the two agent case is the most interesting case to consider, 
because with n > 2 the posited solutions obviously do not make sense if R > n / (n -  2). 
3. The null hypotheses should be interpreted with caution because the experimental setup of Mill- 
ner and Pratt (1989) is not entirely congruent with the simultaneous move requirement (neither 
does it fit the alternating move version studied in Leininger, 1990; Leininger and Yang (1990). 
4. Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) show that one cannot generally blame the non-existence of a pure- 
strategy equilibrium on the failure of payoff functions to be quasi-concave or upper semi- 
continuous. 
5. Although Millner and Pratt claim to be testing the Tullock model, the experiment actually al- 
lows the rent-seekers to expend resources continuously over a small time interval. Hence, the 
experiment does not formally test he original one-shot simultaneous-move Tullock game. This 
problem is corrected in the experiments of Shogren and Balk (1991), who do not reject he theo- 
retical prediction when R = 1. 
6. The continuous trategy space (infinite game) is dealt with below. 
7. The mixed strategies may be degenerate, i.e., in the case of a pure strategy equilibrium. 
8. Shogren and Balk (1991) state that the behavioral inconsistency reported in Mitlner and Pratt 
" . . .  is due to the nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium, tn this case there is no predictable be- 
havioral benchmark to measure the experimental evidence against." Our Theorem 2, however, 
provides uch a benchmark. Shogren and BaJk are referring to the non-existence of a symmet- 
ric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
9. In future work it may be of interest to repeat he experiment for R = 3 and Q small such that 
alI the properties of the symmetric equilibrium can be evaluated, i.e., the values of the py'S. 
10. Calculations are based on (3.34 - 3.9)/s 1 = -5.11 and (84 - 97.5)/s z = -2.73,  where s 1 
and s 2 were calculated from Millner and Pratt (t989) using (3.34 - 6)/s I = - 24.28 and (84 
- 150)/s 2 = -13.37. 
11. See atso Shogren and Balk, who run a related experiment for R = 1 and find that he Nash 
equilibrium dissipation hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 90 percent level. 
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Append ix  
In this Appendix we show that, for v >__ 1, the left-hand side of inequality (20) is non-negative, 
while the right-hand side is strictly negative. 
Manipulate the right-hand side as follows: 
(x+ 1) R < 0 
v+l  + x - 2(v+x) > 
(x+ I)R + x ~ 
(v + 1 + x)x g < (v - 1 + x)(x + I) R > 
1 + - -  
v+x- t  
< (I + 1_ )R 
x 
Note that the left-hand side of this last inequality is decreasing in v. Hence, to show that the right- 
hand side of  (20) is negative, it is sufficient o show that such is the case for v = 1. Assuming that 
v = 1, we can further manipulate the last inequality: 
1 + - -  1+x X (1+-  x 
1 + b  
1 1 1 )g -z  
1 + x X (1 +-x ) (1  +_x " 
Evidently, for any x > 0 
1 + - -  
1 1 
<1+- .  
l+x  x 
Thus for any R ~ 2 and x _> 1 the right-hand side of (20) is strictly negative for any v >_ I. 
To obtain the left-hand side result we need to show that for any t such that 
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Q-  1 >_t_x  + t, 
(x+ 1) R (x+ 1)R x R 
_>2 
(x+l )  R + t R (x+l )R  + x R x R + t R 
Manipulation yields 
[ (x+l )  R + xRI[x R + tRl < 2xR[(x+I)R + t R] 
XR(X+I) R + tR(x+ 1) R + X zR + XRt R < 2X R (X+ 1) R + 2xRt R 
<0.  [(X+I)R -- xRI[t R -- X R] > 
Because t _. x + 1 > x, the left-hand side of  this last inequality is unequivocally positive, and hence 
the left-hand side of  (20) is non-negative. 
